Abstract
Regional planning initiatives emerge in response to a growing number of land use and related issues that transcend political and jurisdictional boundaries and often involve business and non-profit organizations. Cities are no longer centrals in planning discussions. Urban networks better reflect the new spatial dynamics. Regional planning strategies are sought to link the public and private spheres of this urban networks action. An important starting point is to organize relations between the relevant and different governmental bodies in the multi-level and multi-agency society. How can the abundance of subterritorial governmental bodies be connected, especially within the light of decentralization processes that are going on? In addition an important question is how this public sphere can be linked to the sphere of private regional action. What are important elements in strategies of ‘organizing connectivity’? Will ‘pragmatic regionalism with a purpose’ be an interesting strategy?

In the light of this growing interest in acting regionally, this paper offers insights in motives for such regionalism. A framework to identify and promote best practices for regional collaboration, with attention for vertical as well as horizontal connectedness within the public sphere, as well as linking this public to the private sphere of regional action will be central. Several motives and principles that might be beneficiary for regional collaboration are dealt with. The case of GOVERA in the Netherlands, an important example of regional cooperation in the transport cluster, will function as illustration.
1. Introduction

Land use and related issues often appear in regions without definite administrative boundaries, in so-called urban networks, with a multitude of different interests and conflicts. Every participant in the network has its own spheres of action besides the one of the network at stake. Fragmentation in urban networks makes it difficult to deal with land use and related issues by way of regional governance. Nevertheless there is a need for regional governance as in planning the regional level is increasingly seen as the scale at which the most important planning challenges occur. The European and international context has had important effects on the representation of regional identity (the conceptual shape), taking it out of the framework of the state and encouraging a process of imitation and learning among regions in different states (Keating, 1997: 388). The rules of engagement for international competition compel regional responses. Nations, states and cities matter, of course, but the region is the decisive, strategic platform for economic success and quality of life (Johnson & Peirce, 2004). Too much local competitiveness might undermine the region as a whole. Local and global integration are mutually intertwined (the ‘glocalisation hypothesis’) (Swyngedouw, 1992) and regions will have to define their own answers, within national frameworks. This asks for decentralization and regionalization of policies. The case for organizing this connectivity at the metropolitan-wide and regional level is emphasized in several publications (Healey, 1997; Salet et al, 2003).

Decentralization and regionalization of policy are indeed taking place but practice shows that these processes are still in development and not without difficulties. At the regional level most of the important actors converge and form coalitions and networks, whether area oriented or flow oriented (Keating, 1998). Research of Sellers (2000) shows that large cities increasingly construct governance arrangements outside their own municipal or city borders, creating horizontal relations based on specific policy subjects with other local governance bodies in metropolitan areas. In this way interlocal governance regimes are created that should contribute to a regional balancing of policies but this is not successful in every sense. Interlocal tuning of

---

1 The region does not exist. Although several levels of regions exists, regions will always be constructs, defined on the basis of a particular theme or subject around which the actors have formed a coalition. It is possible that several themes converge in the same region at one point in time and so do the coalitions. More likely, however, is the existence of several different coalitions within one territorial framework, all with a different scope. On the contrary, functional regions, are not likely to be territorially based. For example, the municipality of Rotterdam (and especially the port of Rotterdam) has more connections and coalitions with the Ruhrarea in Germany, than it has with its neighbours. This functional space concept joins with the network concept of Castells (1991). The content of regional area development and the demarcation of the region are inseparably connected. Both are continuously variable.
policy is mainly directed to allocation and developmental policies. However, these policies are not always successful in practice. Redistributive policies generally lack on the metropolitan level because this scale is too small for that (Peterson, 1981). Nowadays these twin challenges of decreasing inequality and increasing economic vitality are more and more viewed as inextricably linked and only solvable at a metropolitan scale (Pastor et al, 2000: 155). This results in a quest for regional approaches. Until now, attempts to integrate policies at the metropolitan level through administrative reform have generally failed (Barlow, 1991; WRR, 1992). Therefore the focus is no longer on restructuring regional and local government but on finding ways to coordinate joint efforts between and within administrative levels (Kreukels, 2000; Rothblatt & Sancton, 1998). This is a search for new forms of effective regional governance to address metropolitan area problems (Pierce, 1993; Downs, 1994; Brunori & Henig, 1996; Orfield, 1997; Rothblatt & Sancton, 1998; Harding, Wilks-Heeg & Hutchins, 1999; Rusk, 1999; Duany et al, 2000; Heinz, 2000; Calthorpe & Fulton, 2001). New regionalists define governance as the functional and territorial coordination of regional activity among numerous stakeholders, public, private and civic, where all of these processes and structures aim to guide developments in such a way, that spatial quality is guaranteed (Wallis, 1994; Keating, 1998; Foster, 2000; Wallis, 2002). Thus regional governance is seen as the new way to solving regional questions.

The awareness of the need of regional governance has led to many ideas on what the characteristics of this governance should be and on how to arrive at this governance. It is widely realized that at this regional level the ambitions to arrive at more coherent developments must be overcome in coordinative public and private action (Peirce et al, 1993; Orfield, 1997; Katz, 2000; Johnson & Peirce, 2004). Pastor cum suis urge planners and others engaged in acting on these regional issues to take the ‘high road to economic development’ by simultaneously pursuing three interrelated goals: fostering economic growth, encouraging environmental sustainability and strengthening the region’s social fabric (Pastor et al, 2000: 155). To attain at effective intraregional cooperation actors often form coalitions; political coalitions in the electoral process, administrative coalitions in social movements, and interlocal dynamics coalitions of cooperation and competition with adjacent municipalities. According to Sellers (2000: 197) in these coalitions

---

2 Allocation is about the basic facilities: police, fire-brigade, waste collection, drainage etcetera. Development is about new developments. Both these functions require local intervention because this is most efficient. Adequate development requires enough local financial autonomy, but at the same time (re)distibution in regions is important. This might interfere with financial autonomy. Peterson (1981) shows us the relation between the three functions. Development is necessary to finance distribution and allocation.
local participants should work within the administrative and political infrastructures of higher levels of policy and should base themselves on specific regional issues.

However, at the moment this intraregional collaboration is underdeveloped (Newman, 2000). This is due to the fact, that this query for the improvement of strategic area development puts fragmented regions in serious coordination problems (WRR, 1998). On the one hand the local governments compete with one another for the best housing locations, most offices and highest quality industrial parks. This is essential for keeping a vital system that leads to more economic development; as public choice theorists already argued (Ostrom, 1971; Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961). On the other hand, however, local governments have to cooperate, with each other and other regional partners (civic and private actors) in order to compete with other, national and international, regions. This need for cooperation and competition creates a dilemma. A balance has to be sought between competition and co-operation: a coopetitive situation (Porter, 1998; Wallis, 2002). But how could such a balanced situation be arrived at?

‘Regional governance’ seems to have become the magic spell to solve regional coordination problems in the face of international and inter-local competition for housing, offices, business, and, in the end, prosperity. The use of magic spells, however, can be dangerous when they are not precise enough and do not fit to the motivations of the persons you are actually proclaiming your spell on. As will be shown in section two in the creation of the coalitions around regional subjects many different motives can play a role. One has to know what motivates players involved in regional governance processes to cooperate or defy in the economic development. Only then we can understand their behavior and think about the elements that are important in strategies for solving regional dilemmas. Only then we can understand when this regional collaboration can be successful. There are more spells needed than the very general ‘regional governance’ spell. In this paper, we will start with developing these spells by looking closer to motives that stimulate or hinder regional governance in general (section two) and in a case study of goods transport in the Randstad (GOVERA) in the Netherlands (section three). Furthermore we will identify principles for successful regional collaboration (section four). This paper will end with some concluding remarks (section five).
2. Motives for regional governance

Calthorpe & Fulton (2001) present regional planning as a design process, where regions are composed of repeating units drawn from a palette of neighborhoods, centers, districts (dominated by single purpose uses), preserves (open space and working landscapes) and corridors (natural or infrastructure systems). Within such a design process, several motives play a role in the realization of regional governance.

2.1 Seven motives for regional governance

Literature reveals seven motives for regional collaboration. These motives of both public and private parties are attached to the content of planning (see McGinnis & Ostrom, 1992; Rusk, 1999; Lefèvre, 2000: 277-358; Post, 2000; Janssen-Jansen, 2001; Van Stipdonk et al, 2001; Markusen, 2002: 280; Wallis, 2002: 2). In this collaboration both (trans local) public-public and public-private collaboration is involved because also the market is part of regional collective action. Notwithstanding the fact that coalitions often evolve around specific issues, there often is a common ground between the content, context and process matters of collaboration.

The first motive is about the spatial characteristics of the area itself: for example, a well-known name, character, or clear boundaries (for example a river). Spatial changes through growth, suburbanization and exurbanization can be found out to be problematic and might result in the desire to control developments. Spatial problems that are felt are the idling of the urban region, continuous extra infrastructure requirements and the loss of open space though sprawl and problems as the result of the concentration of developments. Motives behind this desire to control are attention for the environment and the protection of nature (Krumholz, 1997; Puijn, 2001; 1000 Friends of Oregon, 2000). Growth controlling often results in regional coalitions (Rusk, 1999). However, the question remains whether this motive is sufficient enough to create the political power that is necessary to unite a region. Without political willingness decisions about higher densities etcetera will not be made (Gainsborough, 2000).

Secondly, there are economical motives. Some regions have a weak economical structure. This asks for a collaborative approach of restructuring in order to increase the economic quality of the region (Boschma et al, 2002). Good conditions for establishing new business, like adequate infrastructure, business and office areas are important (Peterson, 1981: 22; Wever, 1995: 58; Boekema, 2001). The strengthening of the regional embeddedness of companies is an important goal (Atzema & Boschma, 2002). In his research Hobma (2000) shows that municipalities are
more willing to collaborate in the realization of motorways if they themselves have an infrastructural and economical interest. Although external factors have a large influence on the regional economy, municipalities generally aspire more prosperity, more jobs and a high BNP per person through their own actions. Especially important to this end are developmental policies (Peterson, 1981: 20); the largest source of municipal income (see also Lowry, 2000). Municipalities compete with their neighbors for developments. However, developmental policies not only foster regional competition, they are also a motive for more collaboration when it comes to interregional competition with other regions. Interregional competition is increasingly important in the globalizing world. Regional capital, land use, and labor markets are important factors in this competition (Peterson, 1981: 29). Interregional competition brings about the need for coopeation or competitive cooperation (Porter, 1998; Wallis, 2002). Local-regional players (and their capital) can form so-called ‘urban growth machines’ in order to stimulate regional economic development (Logan & Molotch, 1987). These stable growth coalitions try to promote new developments, coupled to existing opportunities and possibilities in the region (Wallis, 2002). US-growth-machines often affect real estate developments and concentrate on the local level. Therefore, the local embeddedness is strong, but the regional embeddedness is poor.

Social-cultural motives form a third category. Central to this category are the social problems related to the above-mentioned developments: for example the policies of mayor cities that regionally affect the problems of concentration of low-income groups and social housing (see also Orfield, 1997). Gainsborough (2000: 5-9) has shown in her US-research that if the dissatisfying threshold becomes too high, municipalities are willing to exchange local control for regional cooperation. Successes of such a regional cooperation will result in more trust and as a consequence in more cooperation, depending on the issues. Regional cooperation is not likely with life style values, like schools, parks, neighbors and work-travel time. These functions are very close to people and they do not like to lose (a part of) their say to a higher governmental body of neighboring municipalities. Maintenance functions, like communication systems, public transport, waste recycling, and drainage are less delicate issues for civilians and lower governments, as far they do not concern life style values.

A fourth category of collaboration motives consists of governmental-institutional ones. The call to overcome problems as a result of the lack of coherent plans, the fragmented politics and institutional landscape is important here. Scharpf suggests more coordination here (1993: 125). He points at the adequacy of this coordination, not too much or too less. Comprehensive
plans in classic terms, as sometimes are proposed have appeared to be impossible because of the abundance of interests (Althusser, 1965; Innes, 1994; Kreukels, 1995). However, collaboration is often directed at more coherence and is about comprehensiveness in more modern terms: the mutual optimalization of regional issues.

Fifthly, political-institutional motives play a role. Here, the most important example is the quest for a regional government. Also, cooperation as solution/flight for annexation belongs to this category. Another example is the making of a regional plan after annexation procedures wherein all new and old inhabitants can contribute in order to ease the annexation pain and to create a regional identity. In this way the image of a region is strengthened. In this respect also the European project of regional integration is important.

In all these five categories of motives the belief in efficiency and effectiveness of regional, uniform rules plays an important role. Regional cooperation is a reaction to the mentioned issues. These issues differ between regions and might manifest themselves on different levels of scale. Another important cause for regional collaboration is the idea that collaboration adds to more intraregional equality, because cooperation will contribute to redistribution. This falls into the sixth category of motives for collaboration: the financial ones. Regionalization will deconcentrate poverty as the result of an enlarged tax base. At the same time resources for schools and other facilities will become spread more evenly. Financial resources are quite often used to create a feeling of solidarity in a region (especially with the centre). Sometimes this concerns legal arrangements, but it might also function as a 'carrot' (incentive) (see also Oosterhoff et al, 2000). Via an (hierarchically given) incentive the involved players are stimulated to cooperate. Distributive policies can only be realized at a higher than local level (Peterson, 1981; 1995). In the US redistribution hardly exist. Minneapolis-St-Paul is an exception. In European countries redistributive policies are more common, but mostly on the national level because of the quest for national equity. The emphasis on this national redistribution, especially in the 1960s till 1980s resulted is the oppression of the developmental and allocation functions at the local and regional levels. In the last decade (ideas of) decentralization got important. The enthusiasm for decentralization was a result of the relative economic success of the federal countries (US, Canada, Australia and Germany). Decentralization might result in region building. Decentralization will be accompanied by the necessity for the enlargement of the sub national economic and administrative expertise. An important problem is the resulting inequality between regions. However, aspiring for equity
conflicts with aspiring for strong economic regions (Salet et al, 2003: 388). The solution might be found in realizing development and redistribution at different levels of scale, wherein, economic inequity is possible but where at the same time on a higher level a social safety net will exist.

The seventh and last category is the personal motives of for example the initiators of regionalisation. Sometimes higher levels of governments top down initiate regionalisation, but regional involvedness also comes from the bottom up. Leadership is an important factor in adequate regional governance. Bryson & Crosby (1992) give a key role to ‘leaders’ when it comes to recognizing ‘opportunity structures’ in the regional network and in relation mobilizing of networks around set goals and accompanying strategies (see also Hambleton et al, 2002). Innes (1994) shows that these initiators come from different institutional positions. The persuasiveness of the leaders not only depends on their positions but also especially on their characters, for example their ability and urge to learn and in this way to arrive at more elaborated cooperation. Arriving at innovative regional planning outcomes is thus a consequence of a regional ‘puzzling and powering’ process (learning and use of power in decision making, see Visser & Hemerijck, 1997). Also important for their actions are their positive and negative experiences with cooperation and whether they have trust is in the parties they work with (Smits & Nelissen, 1999). This will enlarge the regional network. Trust is based on operative social norms in society (Van de Klundert, 1999: 7, see also Fukuyama, 1995: 26). How to treat other parties is one of the ‘rules of the game’. These personal motives often connect with political-institutional ones, because the political embeddedness of persons (party politics) might play an important role. Variation in persons can mean the end of regional cooperation.

2.2 The motives in the regional game

With the seven categories of motives insights are given at the background of cooperation. Motives concerning the content of the region (space, economy, social capital etc.) are very important, because these form the base of coalitions. This is about ‘ad hoc coordination’; regional players start cooperation out of a well-defined motive (Scharpf, 1997; Porter & Wallis, 2002). This kind of regional governance is also known as pragmatic regionalism with a purpose; players cooperate without hierarchy, where identifying with each other’s interests and common responsibility are on top of the agenda. The purpose is to realize a livable community, healthy environment, vibrant economy (McKinney et al, 2004: 6). Several stages in regional collaboration can be distinguished. In terms of Innes and Booher (2000: 15) we distinguish
reciprocity (with one-issue cooperation as consequence), relationships (actors work together, come to co-productions and thus form regional social capital), learning (together partners really come a step further in the development, whether or not via double loop learning\(^3\)) and creativity (pointed at combined innovative efforts and regional planning outcomes\(^4\)). Research has shown that in the Netherlands the stadium of relationships focused on arriving at more spatial quality is seldom achieved (Janssen-Jansen, 2004) and that even common views are rare.

All motives that stimulate collaboration may work as well in a reversed way and strengthen the competition between local players. They then become disincentives for regional cooperation. Within the last category, this might result in an unwillingness to redistribute. When motives work in the reversed way spatial solutions are not realized because no decisions will be taken at the regional level (Rosenthal et al, 2000: 116). The planning game then becomes a coordination dilemma. There is a common interest, but because of the circumstances, for example a lack of trust, this will not be acknowledged (Scharpf, 1997). In cases like this institutions play an important role in creating such situations but also to overcome them. Thus, institutions are important to understand the situation. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) point in this respect to the ‘second face of power’, i.e. the ability of actors to object decision making on purpose and to exclude some themes from the political agenda. Especially with multilateral negotiations the amount of interests and options will increase and as a result it is more likely that one of the players will freeze the negotiations (Scharpf, 1993). Costs of decision-making or external political costs also might be a reason not to act collectively. The first costs are about the investment in terms of money, time, and energy. The second costs result from the compromises players have to make, for example a damaged image (Teisman, 1992). Players aspire to minimize social interaction costs and have the disposal of the choice to participate to the interaction or to exit (compare to the ‘voice’, ‘exit’ and ‘loyalty’ option of Hirschman, 1970). The lack of

\(^3\) In single loop learning, a group can develop a more effective way of solving their problem than they had before, perhaps by working together. But in some cases with particularly intractable problems, there may be no solution, which is satisfactory to all these divers players, even with new options they can discover through dialogue and may identifying their interdependence. In this sort of case, double loop learning may occur and may in fact be the only way to get out of stalemate. In double loop learning, the payers rethink what it is they want to do in the first place. They may reframe the problem or decide that they need to apply different values or that their interests might be met by something quite different from what they originally anticipated (Schon & Rein, 1994). The group can discover that the original way they looked at the problem and the values they brought to it should be changed and new objectives outlined. This can happen without the stakeholders changing their interests, which are deeper and more basic. Rather, they find different ways to express and fulfill their interests (Innes & Booher, 2000: 13-14). During the dialogue and building of reciprocity, relationships and learning, the participants begin to change, and the way they act begins to change. These changes change the complex system into an adaptive one, with the capacity to learn and grow by feedback and distributed intelligence. Through this bottom up changes the creativity stage comes into existence (Innes & Booher, 2000: 15).

\(^4\) The stage of creativity point at a adaptive system, structurally open for learning and growing by using innovative solutions. Creativeness can also exist at the beginning of planning processes (for example in interactive experiments, but then it is mostly about ad hoc and not structural (institutionalize learning and innovative) solutions.
consensus might result in joint-decision-traps: persistent forms of indecision (Scharpf, 1988). The motives differ between regions and it is also unlikely that all motives will occur on the same level of scale; probably a situation of competitive scales is more likely. In a reader about intraregional cooperation Heinz (2000: 23) concludes that intraregional cooperation has many faces, depending on specific problems, tasks and underlying motives; local political and administrative structures; the national context, and especially specific players and their willingness to cooperate. The specificity of a region, with the competencies belonging to it, is of great importance. This implies that regions are never the same and decision-making within and between regions will always come down to selectiveness.

The above-mentioned motives are not only important with the realization of cooperation but also with the success or failure of this cooperation. The urgency must be large enough to result in an attractive advantage. A conclusion is that with coercion for example financial conditions, cooperation might be stimulated. At the same time, contramotives for collaboration exist. Terhorst en Van de Ven (1997: 21) typify cooperation as a ‘mixture of conflict and coordination’. This tension will not only be solved with financial incentives, no more than formal cooperation arrangements between the local players, a hierarchical authority or annexation (Sellers, 2000: 289). A willingness to cooperate is more decisive (Zimmerman, 2001). The most important condition for successful regional cooperation is the existence of a local, but also regional basis.

Until now, this paper identified several motives for regional cooperation. In the next section the GOVERA initiative (Goederen Vervoer Randstad) in the Netherlands is discussed as an example of regional collaboration in the field of goods transport. We show to what extent the diverse motives play a role in this collaboration case.
3. The Case of GOVERA

In GOVERA regional, local and national public and private bodies cooperate. Of the business organizations, only the participating chambers of commerce have a specific geographical focus. Map 1 shows the area covered by the different organizations participating in GOVERA; in Table 1 the participating organizations are listed. The aim of GOVERA is to solve problems in goods transport through cooperation between different regional public bodies and business. The development of cooperation in GOVERA and the way in which projects in this organization are carried out, reflect to a large extent, the motives and difficulties for regional governance as indicated in the previous section.

![Map 1: area covered by the organizations participating in GOVERA](image)

Figure 1: area covered by the organizations participating in GOVERA

---

This section is based on the policy vision document of GOVERA, the GOVERA congress of 2004, interviews with the GOVERA program leader and with other public and private organizations working in the transportation industry.
Table 1: organizations participating in Govera (source: Govera 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Rijkswaterstaat</th>
<th>Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Noord-Holland</td>
<td>• Amsterdam</td>
<td>• Noord-Holland</td>
<td>• EVO (syndicate for shippers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Zuid-Holland</td>
<td>• Rotterdam</td>
<td>• Zuid-Holland</td>
<td>• TLN (Transport and Logistics Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Utrecht</td>
<td>• Utrecht</td>
<td>• Utrecht</td>
<td>• BVB (information agency for inland shipping)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Flevoland*</td>
<td>• Den Haag</td>
<td>• IJsselmeer area</td>
<td>• Chambers of commerce in the Randstad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Flevoland has recently quit Govera

3.1 Govera: a bottom up network in the field of the transport of goods

Govera started in 1992 as a bottom-up organization of four Provinces and Regional directions of Rijkswaterstaat. Soon after the start in 1992 other interested parties have joined the organization. In 2001 the national government released a note that stated the importance of regional collaboration in goods transport. At this time, also the four Randstad cities Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, and Utrecht entered the Govera network. Furthermore four chambers of commerce have joined. So called ‘kaderwet gebieden’, official areas of regional collaboration between municipalities, are not officially part of Govera but on the level of projects Govera increasingly develops partnerships with them.

Govera can be seen as an example of the first stage of regional collaboration as described by Innes & Booher (2000:15) since this collaboration is based on one issue: goods transportation. But with a closer look to the development of the organization, it is possible to distinguish more stages of collaboration. Originally the parties in Govera collaborated mainly in the field of research. Sometimes they did the research themselves but more often they jointly contracted out research to other parties. This research on goods transport was mainly descriptive with the aim of getting a better understanding of this sector and a better idea of what policy should be carried out. The participants shared a need for knowledge and as such the collaboration in the first phase can be seen as one issue collaboration. But at the same time the research added to joint learning and understanding of the situation of regional goods transport. This made it possible to come a step further in the development of regional policy. This second stage of co-productions and regional social capital was effectively realized in 1997 when the first general policy view of Govera on goods transport in the Randstad came out and a regional and spatial vision on goods transport was created. The central concept of networks and nodes in this document is still in use. Currently

---

6 Rijkswaterstaat is the Dutch Directorate for Public Works and Water management.
four different nodes and flows of goods are been discerned: bulk; regional and international containers; high frequency partial loads (like pallets); and home delivery loads. Together these loads need an infrastructure network and nodes with certain qualities. The development of this Quality Network for the Transport of Goods (QNTG) has become central to the work of GOVERA. The parties in GOVERA are developing a map on which they indicate the main roads, rails and waterways for good transport. GOVERA has taken up the development of this Quality Network for Goods Transportation while the desire to develop this has come from business and the Ministry of Transport and Water management.

It can be said that the development of a transport network for goods broadly consists of two steps: paperwork and physical realization. First the network has to be developed in theory or on paper: parties have to develop a common idea of what the network should look like. Secondly parties have to realize the network in their territories. The organizational structure of GOVERA makes it easier to take the first step than the second. GOVERA is a network organization in the sense that there is no central leader or a hierarchical structure. The leader of the program is mainly a coordinator. This makes the network flexible and open to initiatives of the partners, but this also means that there is a lack of power to enforce cooperation. When parties do not want to cooperate, they just leave the network or a specific project. Recently the province of Flevoland step out of the network. But in the case of the QNTG, the physical realization depends on the participants of all players in the region, whether inside or outside GOVERA. For example by participating in projects of GOVERA or through provincial and municipal plans that, as GOVERA states, should be in tune with the vision developed by GOVERA. But there are no official power mechanisms that can enforce this commitment from public bodies. However, central government through the ministry of Traffic and Water management funds the development of this Quality Network for Goods Transport and as such can stimulate local players to take action.

3.2 Motives for regional governance in GOVERA

The motives for cooperation in GOVERA are very well in line with the theory as developed in the previous section. The most important motive for cooperation that was present at the start of the network can be described as personal motives and these motives still appear to be very important in the participation. Civil servants working on transport and traffic are often not with many others in the same field in their organizations. For these officials the GOVERA network is a way to meet other people who are working on the same kind of problems and understand their position
towards other policy fields. Furthermore, the projects that are carried out in the network motivate them by their nature, as the chairman of the network formulated it ‘Govera is a club of Gyro Gearloose-like people who enjoy to carry out interesting projects. Govera functions almost like a club of good friends!’ Personal motives play also a role in relation to the politician the civil servant in the Govera network is working for. If this politician is not interested or does not have a good relation with this civil servant, participation will be much more difficult.

At the start of the Govera cooperation was mainly in the field of research with the aim of gaining quantitative knowledge about goods transport in the Randstad but with the development of the policy view of Govera the motivation for cooperation has more clearly become economic in nature as well. In the policy vision of Govera transportation and accessibility are seen as necessary conditions to keep the Randstad economically healthy and a competitive location for business. These conditions seem increasingly to be threatened because of traffic jams and the growing amounts of traffic. Participants feel that a solution to these problems cannot be found locally since goods transport takes place at a regional or a (international) level. However, economic motives of regions are not the only kinds of economic motives that are important. As the example in the next discussion of environmental motives shows, economic considerations at the company level are also very important to take into account. A lack of understanding of business motives may make private parties very skeptical about the initiatives taken by organizations such as Govera. It seems to be important that public participants in organizations like Govera have a sense for the different goals and time horizons of public and private parties. A little exaggerated but for the case of clarity the difference can be described as innovations for the common interests in the long run for public bodies versus innovations for economic survival at least in the short run for private businesses.

Environmental considerations were entered the collaboration of Govera with the development of the policy vision. The predicted strong growth of goods to be transported in the coming twenty years generates the fear for a heightened nuisance from trucks and environmental burden in cities. Modal shifts and more efficient transportation should prevent these negative externalities from becoming a problem. A project in this case is the FoodNet pilot. In this project road haulers were brought together and a system was developed that made it possible for them to share loads. In this way the load capacity of trucks is used more efficiently which results in less traffic. This pilot has been a success because of the direct financial benefits of FoodNet for the

---

7 Gyro Gearloose is one of the characters in the cartoons of Donald Duck. He is an inventor/professor (Willie Wortel in Dutch).
participating truckers. It also responded to a demand in the market for reliable and highly frequent delivery of small loads. Motives in the field of business economics are very important in getting private parties interested. In the case of FoodNet societal and business goals could be matched but often this is not the case. Moreover when goals can be matched, coordination and involvement of public parties still seem to be very important. When this involvement ends and economic conditions change, the costs of cooperation in consideration of possible future advantages often become too high for private parties and as a result they stop participating.

**Spatial considerations** are part of the vision of GOVERA but these appeared to be very difficult to translate in clear demands for space for industrial parks. GOVERA had the ambition to indicate the future spatial needs of industrial parks for transportation and logistics but in practice there are no industrial parks only serving transportation and logistics companies. Transportation and logistics are in fact part of a chain of activities not necessarily directly in the field of transport and logistics. The subject on spatial needs for industrial parks, therefore, turned out to be beyond the scope of the GOVERA network.

**Administrative-institutional motives** are very important in the GOVERA cooperation. One example of this motive can, again, be found in the case of the Quality Network for the Transport of Goods. As said before, the aim of the QNTG is that individual municipalities and the provinces will use it as a frame of reference for spatial planning and economic policy. In the current practice of planning in municipalities and provinces this often is a problem. Although other policy fields are being asked to pay attention to goods transport, often nobody has a good idea in what way this should be done. The QNTG can solve this problem, as it is a good point of reference for paying attention to goods transport in other policy fields. The general policy vision of GOVERA has as well the ambition to serve as a help to tune the policy instruments of different public bodies. Policy instruments that municipal and provincial bodies may tune to the vision of GOVERA are for example legislation and rules like spatial plans, prohibitions to pass, and allowances for delivery of goods to shops. Other instruments are financial instruments like subsidies, influencing the market with the development of innovative concepts and the construction and maintenance of infrastructure. The policy vision of GOVERA should, following the policy document of GOVERA, be executed by the individual participants in GOVERA through the utilization of these instruments available to them (Govera, 2003: 19). But even if these public bodies are willing to use their policy instruments, this does not mean that they can enforce that

---

8 Examples are spatial structure plans, provincial, regional and local traffic and transportation plans, zoning plans.
the goals of GOVERA are met. Municipalities have a lot of freedom and, as an example, can establish their own rules for transshipment. In this way it can happen that a shipper who wants to use inland ships instead of trucks to ship earth from Groningen to somewhere in South Holland is not able to use this modality because of local rules. This happened when a municipality a shipper wanted to ship to did not have a quay for transshipment to truck and the two municipalities nearest by that did have a quay did not allow him to use it. One municipality only allowed transshipment if the destination of the earth was inside that municipality. The second municipality only allowed him to transshipment of no more than four trucks a day. This made it impossible and not economic to use inland shipping in this specific case and as a consequence a lot more road traffic was generated from Groningen all the way to South Holland. It is clear that these local rules did not contribute to the goals of GOVERA but the network did not have the legal power to enforce municipalities to act differently. However, in this case personal contacts between the shipper and a participant of GOVERA and officials of the municipalities involved, turned out to be a way to solve the problem.

As far as intraregional equality and financial motives are involved, the fact that many projects of the GOVERA network receive financial support from national government bodies may be a reason for participation. But the network and the project are not entirely financed by the state. The Ministry of Transport and Water management finances 50%, the other 50% comes from the regional partners. The Ministry contributes financially to the network because they find it important that regional authorities pay more attention to goods transport in their policy. The Ministry also funds the development of the QNTG. But redistribution of money in itself does not seem to be a motive for participation.

3.3 Cooperation without enforcement

The GOVERA case shows how motives for regional cooperation can change in time, starting mainly as a research collaboration, developing into a cooperation to reach regional economic and environmental goals and to implement regionally national policy aims. GOVERA thus reflects the reciprocity, relationships and learning stages. What remains constant, however, is the necessity for participants to feel that regional cooperation can help to solve problems they encounter at the regional, local, company or personal level. FoodNet is a good example of bringing together both regional environmental motives and motives at the level of the company in one project. The personal motives of civil servants also continue to be important for collaboration: GOVERA is a
way to meet other people in the same field they cannot find in their organization. Without tools to enforce cooperation, however, it can be very difficult to keep participants investing time and money in the network. Furthermore the case of GOVERA shows that regional planning is certainly not only a matter of regional level collaboration but also of personal networks and collaboration and of national involvement and financial and political support. When parties decide not to invest in the network, they still can use the regional vision that is developed by GOVERA. GOVERA works on the level of the province and big cities, at the municipal level, it is much more difficult to meet the objectives and vision of GOVERA as became clear in the case of transshipment from ark to truck. In cases like this informal networks may appear to be the best way to solve the problems, that is, not via official power to enforce but via good talk and persuasion. On the other hand, the development of the Quality network for Goods Transport has been supported also at the national level.

The example reveals the continued importance of personal motives and relations for policy development and of some sort of hierarchical power or pecuniary carrots for policy implementation and physical development. Knowing the motives for regional governance, illustrated by the case of GOVERA, it is then the question whether it is possible to distill lessons for successful regional coalition building? In the next section a framework for regional collaboration will be build.

**4. Principles for successful regional governance**

Seven principles can be distilled from the literature that embodies practices that create the conditions for successful collaboration (see also Mc Kinney et al, 2004). The first is: 'Make the Case'. The reasons for working regionally must be clear and compelling. The necessity to cooperate should be communicated and metropolitan goals should be set in order to define possible ad hoc responses (Porter & Wallis, 2002). Furthermore key participants should be mobilized and engaged. Building the regional community begins with identifying a credible convener. To achieve the goals, regional initiatives require a certain type of leadership. These ‘regional stewards’ invite people to take ownership and tend to be committed to the long-term well being of a particular place. They apply the same entrepreneurial spirit and persistence to solving regional challenges that business entrepreneurs apply: they are civic entrepreneurs. They see the need for more connected regional approaches to address social, economic and
environmental issues; they are integrators. They built support from leaders, citizens, interest groups and policy makers toward a shared vision: they are coalition builders (Parr et al, 2002). Thirdly, the region should be defined based on people’s interests. It is important to join to a shared sense of regional identity. Regional planning must engage regional interests through an understanding of shared values and concerns. It is important to seek for the relatively permanent region-structuring elements (the spatial, economical, social-cultural, governmental-institutional, political-institutional and financial ones). A fourth principle concerns the fostering of mutual learning: building common understanding fosters a sense of regional identity and often the will to act more regionally (confer Innes & Booher, 2000). How to arrive at such learning stages in regional collaboration? Trust is an important factor, because this is necessary to realize the common (regional) good while safeguarding individual (local) freedoms. Furthermore, regionalism requires mutual learning for the strengthening of regional identity, the search for political compromises to arrive at regional change, to overcome ‘each for own’ problems, to look for consistency in the policies of higher authorities and for defining mutual interests. Fostering this learning (that might even end up in a ‘creativity’ stage) implies ‘creating a sense of place and a place for action’ (McKinney et al, 2004).

A fifth principle is directed to forging collaborative decision. The regional level lacks an authority and thus it is very difficult to come to decisions. Regional stewards might be force decisions, with or without (financial) incentives. Empirical evidence shows that bottom-up cooperation is the strongest (Janssen-Jansen, 2004). Calculation grounds are quite common in cooperation. This offers opportunities to stimulate cooperation with incentives. This forging also asks for, sixthly, taking strategic actions. The message should be communicated (by the regional stewards). Their efforts should be linked to established decision-making systems by seeking access to power rather than power itself. The whole regional process should be monitored, evaluated and adapted by developing indicator of performance and clarifying who will do what, when and how. The seventh and last principle is about sustaining the regional action and institutionalizing the regional efforts. Regional initiatives should be both idealistic and opportunistic to be effective. Furthermore, regional action will only be possible with sufficient financial autonomy at a local-regional level, including instruments for financial equalization. As said, regional redistribution is difficult. Such a concept will be very important for a more elaborated regional cooperation, because this will offer the regional parties the possibility to negotiate. Greater autonomy will furthermore result in a greater regional bond and in the end this
may lead to greater regional commitment and even increased regional identity. After all, when players can identify more closely with their region, they are more likely to collaborate, even at higher costs (Innes & Booher, 2000). Then regional action will be sustained.

However, besides adequate financial autonomy, a kind of hierarchical redistribution is also necessary, because too much local autonomy will result in too much competition, which will complicate cooperation. Trans-local coopetition will always consist of a balance of both cooperation and coordination. For each region, the balance will be different and dynamic over time. Some general ideas about instruments to channel both forces can be given, as done about financial autonomy, but the value of these instruments depends in practice on the region and its problems and actors, their interaction, norms etcetera. As with the case it is clear that financial decentralization will probably be of no great benefit to overcome current problems in implementing for example the Quality Network for the Transportation of Goods. Financial decentralization will not help to overcome the problems of motivation to participate at the level of market players to invest time in the development of the QNTG. However, the 50% finance of the Ministry of Transport and Water management has been very stimulating for the regional collaboration. But, we should be careful not to be too quick in embracing a specific instrument to foster regional collaboration. Great variation exists between the issues at stake and probably also between and within regions. Also, these success-principles might differ between more general regional collaboration and more functionally orientated regional collaboration, like the GOVERA case. Summarizing the ideas about factors that stimulate regional collaboration, a joint identity and leadership to build consensus and the necessity to plan by opportunity which often involves a sense for the opportunities and goals of both public and private parties, stand out as most important.

5. Concluding remarks
In our view a new planning strategy for strategic regional planning that meets the requirements of contemporary societal conditions and dynamics is necessary. The most important starting point in this paper is that planning issues should be approached more regionally. The institutional capacity of planning systems is often deficient at this level and there is a continuous necessity for trans-local cooperation. Local government is at the proper level for coordinating their own developments in dialogue with their neighbors and with other regional partners from the civil
society and private sector. This quest for regional governance results in many questions about how regional connectivity can be organized. The seven principles of the last section might give a hand in such regional governance processes. However, solutions will always depend on the particular situation and will hardly be general in nature. New instruments might contribute to more collaboration, but then it will always be important to connect to the motives of the regional players. What are the reasons to collaborate? Knowing this, might give grips to boost collaboration and arrive in the creativity stages.

References


Puijn, F. (2001), Regional Growth Management in the USA, Den Haag: Dutch School for Public Administration.
Stipdonk, V.P. van, F. Hendriks & P.W. Tops (2001), Getting it together, A pilot study into innovative forms of cooperation between local and regional authorities. Tilburg: Centrum voor Recht, Bestuur en Informatisering.