Spatial knock-on effects of area-based urban policies: 
Practices from Utrecht, the Netherlands

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Abstract

Nowadays, an area-based approach seems to be common for urban policies in Western Europe. Policies are directed towards spatially defined areas in order to be more efficient in solving problems in cities. Yet, besides solving problems in the targeted area, an area-based approach has an in-built danger: it might lead to a displacement of problems. This so-called spatial knock-on effect is an effect of an area-based policy for other areas then the ones involved in the policy. Especially in the field of urban restructuring, spatial knock-on effects might be expected. In order to learn more about the effectiveness of area-based urban policies, spatial knock-on effects should be more central. In this paper we therefore take a closer look at spatial knock-on effects. On the basis of a case study in the Dutch city of Utrecht we analyse the following questions: In which way can spatial knock-on effects be observed as a result of area-based urban restructuring policies according to policy makers? What is the geographical dispersal pattern of those who are forced to move as a consequence of urban restructuring and how do policy makers explain these dispersal patterns? In which way do policy makers try to prevent spatial knock-on effects? In this paper the focus is on the perception of policy makers. Their opinion is important because they are the ones who define the policies and are thus at least partially responsible for the emergence of spatial knock-on effects.

1. Introduction

In many West European countries the traditional forms of urban policies have changed. In the 1990s national governments faced budgetary difficulties and decided to cut down their expenses on local governments and expand their responsibilities at the same time. For lower levels of government, like municipalities, this meant they had to change their policies to adapt to these changes (Elander, 2002). Nowadays, the term urban governance stands for the new way cities deal with various urban problems. One of the features of urban governance is that not only local and national government are involved, but also actors from the private and the voluntary sector. This creates new political structures with a more interactive role for the involved partners (Coaffee & Healey, 2003). All actors are willing to cooperate because this will bring their ambitions closer to their goals (Andersen & Van Kempen, 2001). Another important characteristic of urban governance is that the targeted spatial unit of the policy has changed. Policies used to be organised in a more universally oriented way where facilities are directed to a whole area and to all inhabitants (Andersen, 2001). Nowadays, there has been a shift from a more sectoral approach to a more area-based approach, which means that policy actions are taken towards spatially defined areas (Andersen & Van Kempen, 2003). This so-called area-based approach would lead to improvements at local level (Van Kempen, 2000).

Several reasons can be given for the replacement of the general approach by the area-based approach. One of the advantages of the area-based approach is that attention can be directed to the areas most in need (Andersson & Musterd, 2005). Concentrating on a smaller spatial unit makes it possible to show visible results in a relatively short time period. Moreover, there is a coordination advantage because all actors concentrate on one area all together. This is increasingly important since, as mentioned above, one of the features of urban governance is involving different kind of partnerships. Local government cooperates with for example housing corporations, private companies and residents’ organisations. This then again enhances the legitimisation of the policy and increases the capacities of local institutions (Andersen, 2001; Andersen & Van Kempen, 2003).
However, the drawbacks of an area-based policy are manifold as well (Andersen, 2001). Within area-based policies generally the areas with the biggest problems in unemployment, crime and quality of life aspects are selected. This implies that problems in areas with slightly less problems do not get any attention and disadvantaged residents in non-targeted areas even remain neglected (Andersen & Van Kempen, 2003; Andersson & Musterd, 2005). An area-based policy also assumes that problems are tackled on a local scale like a street or a neighbourhood. It is however possible that problems originate from a higher scale like for instance the city, region or even the country, which might make an approach on a lower geographical scale rather pointless. It might imply that solutions sought after on a street or neighbourhood level may not be found, which finally leads to an unsuccessful policy (Andersen, 2001).

But one of the most significant problems with area-based policies are the so-called spatial knock-on effects. Spatial knock-on effects are effects of an area-based policy for other areas then the area involved in the policy. Urban restructuring, for instance, is an example of an area-based policy which may cause spatial knock-on effects. One of the goal of urban restructuring is to create a more diverse population in a certain neighbourhood, by means of diversifying the housing stock. This implies a change from an area with inexpensive social rented dwellings to an area with more expensive owner-occupied dwellings. This new housing stock may then attract households with higher incomes. The poorer segments of the population are, however, forced to relocate to another affordable dwelling which might lead to new concentrations, elsewhere in the city.

In our opinion, spatial knock-on effects should be more prominent on the urban research agenda in order to have sound evaluations of an urban policy. So far, in policy evaluation studies most interest is in the effects for the targeted area and less attention is being paid to side-effects in other areas. However, if policies result in a displacement of problems, rather than in solving problems the legitimisation of the policy is at stake. Governmental money is spent uselessly and cannot be spent on other important topics.

The aim of this paper is to give more insight in the view of policy makers on spatial knock-on effects as a consequence of urban restructuring processes. The reason they are central is that the effects of their policies may result in a displacement of problems. Policy makers are mainly responsible for spatial knock-on effects that might take place. If they are not aware of spatial knock-on effects this might influence the outcomes of urban policies.

Based on a case study of the city of Utrecht (the Netherlands) we will focus on the following questions: In which way can spatial knock-on effects be observed as a result of area-based urban restructuring policies according to policy makers? What is the geographical dispersal pattern of those who are forced to move as a consequence of urban restructuring and how do policy makers explain these dispersal patterns? In which way do policy makers try to prevent spatial knock-on effects? In order to answers these question we will make use of qualitative data gathered by interviewing policy makers in the city of Utrecht.

The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. Section two will define spatial knock-on effects. Here, we will also focus on the theoretical background of these effects. Section three will focus on the Dutch city of Utrecht, where the research is carried out. We first have to learn more about urban policies in Utrecht.

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1 Spillover effect is one of the terms that is also used to indicate this phenomenon. In section two we explain why we prefer the term spatial knock-on effects.
before we can draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the policies that are carried out. By analysing some quantitative data, we will briefly evaluate the effects of area-based urban policy. Section four is based on qualitative data, gathered through interviews with policy makers. We focus on their opinion and ideas of spatial knock-on effects. In the conclusions some suggestions for further research will be presented.

2. Spatial knock-on effects: a definition and theoretical perspective

Spatial knock-on effects have, rather surprisingly, never been very prominent in urban geography literature. Three other terms have figured in this literature every now and then: spillover effect, displacement effect and externalities. In this section we will briefly review these terms.

Spillover effects can be defined as effects of an occurrence in one area on another area (Cox, 1972). This can be the effect of a physical structure (for example gases from an industrial plant that come down from the air miles further away), and it can be the spatial consequence of an action or policy. Spillover effects can both be positive and negative. Positive spillover effects can be defined as advantages of an action or development in one area for another area. For example: when a museum is built in one area, it may attract visitors who will also do some shopping or go out for dinner in an adjacent area. Spillover effects can also be negative. The same museum may lead to congestion and parking problems when all visitors arrive by car. The term spillover effect is not only used in urban geography, but also in studies in the field of environmental science.

The term displacement effect is often used in relation to studies in the field of housing and residential mobility. Gentrification and urban renewal policies may result in a situation where low-income households are forced to move to another area, because housing is not affordable anymore (Shill et al., 1983; London & Palen, 1984; Atkinson, 2000). This often causes a concentration of those households in another part of the city.

The concept of externalities is defined as the (usually unintended) effects of one person’s actions on another, over which the latter has no control. Externalities can be either positive or negative. Usually there is distance decay in its extent and intensity. An example is when a number of households in a street have a very distinct way of living and disturb their neighbours. This may influence property values in the rest of the street (Johnston et al., 2000).

We however, prefer to use the term spatial knock-on effects, because in our opinion the terms mentioned above all have their problems. Spillover effect is a term that can be used in many circumstances and does not have to be related to policy effects. The same holds for the term externalities. Displacement effects, on the other hand, seem to be applicable mainly to studies about residential mobility. The focus is mainly on the displaced households and less on the so-called receiving areas that have to deal with the effects of the displacement.

With the term spatial knock-on effects we want to stress that a development in an area is the consequence of a policy carried out in another area. The policy is generally aimed at improving a situation in the targeted area, but it may have negative as well as positive effects in another area.

When analysing spatial knock-on effects it is important to pay attention to the spatial scale of the effects. Effects of an area-based urban policy may occur within a very small area, for example a bordering block or street, but it can also spread to a

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2 We also thought about using the term waterbed effect. In The Netherlands, policy makers sometimes use this term. The idea is that a push on one side of the waterbed will cause a flow of water to another side of the bed. We do not use this term here, because we consider it as a too mechanistic term.
much larger area and even extend the city limits. Besides that, effects of an urban policy can be detected in an area located next to the origin area, or in an area that is much farther away. In addition, the effect may be felt on one specific location or on several locations. On which spatial scale effects can be discerned and in which direction the spatial knock-on effects may go, will depend on a number of interrelated factors and developments, such as the character of the problem, the character of the policy, the character of the built environment and the characteristics of the urban population.

In urban geography there does not exist an elaborated theoretical framework with respect to spatial knock-on effects. In order to learn more about spatial knock-on effects some elements of existing theories on urban development and residential mobility are helpful.

From the Human Ecology approach associated with the Chicago School (e.g., Burgess, 1925/1974; Park, 1925/1974; Hoyt, 1939; Harris & Ullman, 1945; McKenzie, 1925/1974), invasion, competition and succession are terms that can be helpful in explaining spatial knock-on effects. According to the Chicago School, the city develops through a competition for space. Burgess’ famous model of concentric urban rings is described as a result of invasion and succession: neighbourhoods change, because different kinds of actors compete for the available space. A move outward from the city centre is generated. This dispersal is caused by the settlement of recent immigrants who move into the relatively inexpensive inner. A result might be a competition for the available dwellings between the new households and the original inhabitants. According to Burgess, this competition causes other more successful groups to move outwards. Those households that can afford it move to better and more expensive places. Their dwellings are partly taken over by new inhabitants who have succeeded their position. The basic idea of the Burgess’ model is that as the city grows outward, each concentric ring places pressure in the ring surrounding it to expand. Bassett and Short (1980, p. 11), summarize this process as follows: “A simple analogy is of a peddle dropped into a pool of water which creates concentric waves reaching out to the water’s edge”.

For the explanation of spatial knock-on effects it would be dangerous to use Bassett and Short’s peddle metaphor (that would be a too mechanistic approach). It would be equally dangerous to use the outcome in terms of concentric rings (Burgess). Another commentary on the Chicago School is that there is not much focus on the role of the state in general and the effects of urban policies more specifically (Van Kempen, 2002). On the other hand, the human ecology approach does still have its value. For instance, the human ecologists were the first to acknowledge that changes in one part of the city do influence other parts of that same city. Besides, the basic terms of invasion, competition and succession, do have their value for research into spatial knock-on effects. While Burgess’s model has been criticized for using plant ecology as theoretical base, later models have used economic theory to explain processes that are similar to invasion and succession (Temkin & Rohe, 1996).

The model of Homer Hoyt, another famous scholar of the Chicago School, can be seen as a reformulation of Burgess’ model and an example of a model that is less based on ecology and more on economic variables. Hoyt (1939) described the city not as a set of concentric rings, but as consisting of different sectors. He sees high-rent-paying households as the motor of spatial form: these households seek out amenities, escape pollution and congestion near the centre and they take into account the significance of the location of work, waterways and railroad lines. Clearly, with these aspects in mind, a concentric pattern would not fit. The households moving to a better place leave behind the less expensive dwellings that are then ‘invaded’ by poorer households. A sectoral pattern emerges, because some areas are more attractive then others. In other words: some areas are skipped.
Attractiveness has not always to be related to the relative distance to the city centre, other factors might be important as well. The term filtering is introduced here as a key driver: households filter up (to better places and dwellings), while dwellings filter down (higher-income households are replaced by lower-income households) (Meulenbelt, 1997). From Hoyt’s sectoral model and the concomitant process of filtering we can learn that in explaining spatial knock-on effects we should be careful to predict the effects to occur automatically in adjacent areas. Adjacent areas can be skipped because they may appear to be less vulnerable. An example can make this clear: demolition in a neighbourhood may force poor people to move to another place. Adjacent neighbourhoods may be too expensive for these forced movers. This forces them to skip that area and to look for a home much further away from the targeted area.

When trying to explain the effects of policies on spatial patterns, we have to include decisions and actions of individuals. From the behavioural approach we learn that the decisions individuals make (Bassett & Short, 1980) and the behaviour of individuals or households are crucial in explaining urban processes. Household characteristics are seen as major determinants of housing (and locational) preferences and residential mobility (Adams & Gilder, 1976). Phases in both the household and labour market career influence the household’s size and its preferred type of dwelling and place to live in (Rossi, 1955; Speare et al., 1975; Stapleton, 1980). The behavioural approach teaches us that the choices individuals and households make should not be overlooked. Urban policies do not mechanistically engender spatial knock-on effects: households make their own decisions and try to find the best place within the possibilities they have.

Individual behaviour is not only determined by individual preferences: choices are always made in an environment of constraints. Rex and Moore’s neo-Weberian approach in their classic study Race, community and conflict (1967) is based on this notion. Desirable housing is seen as a scarce good and different groups of people are differently located with regard to access to these dwellings. Households and individuals are distinguished from one another by their strength in the housing market (Rex, 1968) and this causes better or worse possibilities to live at one place or another. Research into the spatial knock-on effects of urban policies should therefore look at the resources and constraints households and individuals have. The specific location to which people will be able to move will largely depend on the resources people do or do not have. Different resources of households can be identified (see Van Kempen & Özüekren (1998) for a more elaborate overview).

Income is probably the major resource of households. Households with a lower income have fewer possibilities and will therefore generally end up in different parts of the city than those with higher incomes. The most extreme scenario applies when a poor household does not have any possibility at all and ends up in a situation of homelessness. When households are forced to move because of a policy of urban restructuring, high-income households will generally have more alternatives at their disposal than low-income households. Another important resource refers to social contacts people have, which may help them to find suitable housing to live. Social relations of people may direct the move to a specific area, for example to those places where family, friends and acquaintances live. Besides friends, family or colleagues may have information about vacant dwellings in areas the displaced household has never heard of. This might lead to new concentrations of displaced households because those dwellings might be located in a very few areas.

The institutional approach also looks at the opportunities and constraints households face. Yet, the focus is generally not on individuals or households but on the role of institutions like national and local government. Institutions as well as individuals working in institutions can be considered (Herbert & Johnston, 1976; Van Kempen, 2002). National government might decide to raise the expenditures for
rental subsidies. This enhances the possibilities of low-income households when they are relocated by processes of urban restructuring. Austerity programmes may, on the other hand, lead to lower subsidies for housing and, therefore, to fewer affordable dwellings to be built or less maintenance in the older stock, which then negatively influences the housing market possibilities of low-income households. Local governments may decide to allocate dwellings in a neighbourhood only to certain kinds of groups, such as non-immigrants or job-holders (Van Kempen, 2002). When neighbourhoods are virtually closed for a certain group, this may influence directly the opportunities of households belonging to that group.

3. The context of Utrecht and urban policies

In this section several key characteristics of the population and the housing stock of the city of Utrecht are highlighted in order to learn more about the context in which our study takes place. After these basic characteristics, we will focus on the area-based urban policy in Utrecht. The information in this section will help us to better understand the side-effects of the implemented policy. In the end we will make a comparison between the targeted neighbourhoods and the other neighbourhood based on some quantitative data of the city of Utrecht. The aim here is to find some indications of side-effects of area-based urban policies.

The city of Utrecht, which is sometimes characterised as the ‘geographical heart of the Netherlands,’ accommodates approximately 275,000 people. This makes it the fourth largest city of the Netherlands. In the western part of the city the largest extension area of the country is being built. In this district Leidsche Rijn, one of the so-called Vinex locations, 30,000 dwellings will be completed by the year 2015 for around 80,000 inhabitants (Gemeente Utrecht, 2006). At present, there is a lot of pressure on the housing market, which means that buying a dwelling is quite expensive. With respect to housing prices the Utrecht region is one of the most expensive ones of the Netherlands (Gemeente Utrecht, 2005). Renting a dwelling implies a long waiting period of almost six years for a starter on the housing market (Gemeente Utrecht, 2004b). This means that exerting choice in the housing market is not very easy for many people who look for a dwelling in Utrecht.

Most residents in Utrecht live in multi-family dwellings and over 50 per cent of the dwellings belong to the rental sector (table 1). Nowadays, almost 47 per cent of the population owns their dwelling, while in the year 2000 this percentage was only around 38 per cent. This is a consequence of a national policy aiming at building more owner-occupied dwellings and selling more social rented dwellings (Jókövi et al., 2006). Local policies are aiming at the same. With respect to ethnicity, most respondents have a Dutch background (68,5 per cent). The number of residents with a non-Western background includes roughly 25 per cent of the population. Most of them have a Moroccan or Turkish background (Gemeente Utrecht, 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of dwelling</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flat/apartment</td>
<td>53,5 Owner occ.</td>
<td>46,6 Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single family dwelling</td>
<td>43,7 Social rent</td>
<td>40,2 Non-western immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,8 Rent from private person</td>
<td>13,3 Western immigrant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gemeente Utrecht, 2006

Over one third of the inhabitants is aged under 25, which makes that Utrecht’s population can be labelled as young. The relatively large number of students explains
the presence of the relatively large group of young people. After completing their studies, many of them stay in the city, partially because of availability of jobs in and around Utrecht (Van Ham, 2002). This partly explains the pressure on the local housing market. When looking at income, the Utrecht population has an average household income of EUR 24,000 in 2000, which was relatively low compared to the average of EUR 28,000 in the rest of the country (CBS, 2006). Besides that, the unemployment rate in 2005 is 6.7 per cent which is rather high compared to the national average of 4.5 per cent (CBS, 2006).

In the 1990s a new urban policy was implemented in the Netherlands to solve problems in Dutch cities. The aim of this Big Cities Policy is to create a so-called ‘complete city’. This means that economic, social and physical measures go hand in hand to make the city liveable for all inhabitants. The Big Cities Policies has an area-based focus and concentrates on a selected number of deprived areas in the city (Aalbers et al., 2004; Dekker & Van Kempen, 2004; Van Kempen, 2000).

In Utrecht, local government has pointed out five areas that are labelled as attention area in the Big Cities Policy (see figure 1). These areas house around 40 per cent of the Utrecht population, 50 per cent of the unemployed and 60 per cent of the non-Western immigrants (Gemeente Utrecht, 2001).

Figure 1 Attention areas in Utrecht

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overvecht</th>
<th>Kanaleneiland/Transwijk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08 Taagdreef/Zamenhoffdreef</td>
<td>23 Kanaleneiland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Wolgadreef, Neckardreef</td>
<td>24 Transwijk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Amazonedreef</td>
<td>Hoograven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Zambesidreef, Tigrisdreef</td>
<td>20 Oud Hoograven, Tolsteeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 Nieuw Hoograven, Bokkenbuurt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zuilen

| 04 Zuilen-west |
| 05 Zuilen-noord/oost |

Ondiep/2\textsuperscript{e} Daalsebuurt

| 07 Ondiep/2\textsuperscript{e} Daalsebuurt |

Source: Gemeente Utrecht, 2005
In Utrecht the basic covenant of the municipality for the period 2000-2005 is called ‘Utrecht groeit, stedelijk ontwikkelingsplan Utrecht 2000-2005’ (Utrecht is expanding, urban development scheme 2000-2005). The title refers to the cities still growing attractiveness to visitors, residents, students and other newcomers, and firms. Like in most cities, Utrecht has a diversified population. Divisions are based on education, jobs, ethnicity, type of housing and type of neighbourhood in which people live. In some neighbourhoods the number of social and economic problems is larger than in other parts of the city. People living in problem areas are also complex because residents who are jobless may at the same time have more trouble with their health and may face different problems with safety in their neighbourhood. In addition, people with a non-Western background sometimes face worse opportunities on the labour market compared to Dutch people (Gemeente Utrecht, 1999). The policy makers of Utrecht are aware of the inequalities in the municipality. A more even dispersion of different kinds of people over the city is seen as a solution to these problems. The final goal is to create a city where different types of people live next to each other.

More explicitly, the covenant mentions three goals that the Big Cities Policy aims to address. The first is to improve the accessibility of Utrecht and thereby stimulate economic growth. Secondly, the aim is to create a social and safe city. Therefore, one of the aims is to improve safety on the streets and reduce crime and criminality. The focus is clearly area-based, because some problem areas receive more policy attention that others. The third goal of the Big Cities Policy is to reduce the pressure on the housing stock and to create attractive residential environments. Local government indicates a gap between the existing and the desired housing stock (Gemeente Utrecht, 1999). Building new dwellings in the extension area Leidsche Rijn does reduce the pressure on the housing market, but the building process has to speed up. Also, Utrecht has an over-representation of social rental dwellings in certain neighbourhoods. Restructuring is said to be important to create an attractive housing stock and to extend choice opportunities for different types of households. This will then prevent the more well-to do residents from leaving the city.

For the period 2005-2009 local government has come up with a second covenant for the Big Cities Policies, named ‘Grotestedebneleid in uitvoering’ (To accomplish Big Cities Policy). The problem areas are now labelled as ‘urgentiegebied’ (urgency area) where police, local government and housing associations work together to reduce crime rates in specific target areas or groups (Gemeente Utrecht, 2004a). The physical condition of the city remains a central theme of the Big Cities Policies. Included in the agreement is that 9,500 social rented dwellings will be replaced by 3,000 new social dwellings and 6,000 dwellings in the owner-occupied sector before 2015 (Gemeente Utrecht, 2002). This means that the supply of the social rented housing stock will diminish in the future.

At this point we present some data about the city of Utrecht. We compare target and non-target areas of urban policies and look at the dispersal patterns of several groups of people. Here, we look at concentrations of people that are unemployed, depend on welfare or have a non-western immigrant background. The reason is that these people often belong to the target groups of Big Cities Policies. The question is whether a more even spread of different types of people has taken place when comparing the years before and after implementing Big Cities Policy In this way, spatial knock-on effects cannot be discovered directly, but there might be an indication for the side-effects of area-based urban policies.

The unemployment rate in Utrecht in several years is shown in Table 2. It appears that the unemployment rate has declined after the implementation of the area-based urban policy in 2000. Later on, there seems to be a contradictory movement: the figures show an increase in target areas and a decline in non-target
areas. People who are unemployed do clearly not spread out over the city; their spatial concentration is even reinforced.

The information about the percentage of residents who receive social welfare shows a different trend. Generally, the tendency for a decline seems to be the case in both target and non-target areas. However, the decline appears, rather unexpectedly, to be stronger in the non-target areas than in the target areas. Although it is not possible to assign a direct relation with the implemented policy, it seems that also here the tendency towards spatial concentration of disadvantaged groups is reinforced. A more even spread of different groups of people does not take place.

The same conclusion can be drawn with respect to the dispersion of ethnic minorities (table 3). The increase of people with a non-Western background is much stronger in the target areas of the Big Cities Policy. Apparently, the aim of the municipality of Utrecht to accomplish a more even dispersion of different population groups is not reached. Although displacement cannot be measured with the presented data, it seems not to be very likely that many people with a vulnerable position have been displaced from a target area to a non-target area. It might be the case that area-based urban policies lead to displacements within the vulnerable areas of the city where problems are already concentrated. Problems stay close to the target areas of urban policies. In relation with the earlier discussed theories there is a connection with the Chicago School. From Hoyt we learned that spatial knock-on effects not automatically take place in an adjacent area but can jump over to other areas even the ones far away from where the policy was carried out. Spatial knock-on effects regarding displacements of groups of people seem to evoke a pattern where non-target areas are skipped. Displacements can take place in areas close to the original target area or in target areas that are located further away.

| Table 2 Unemployment rate and people that depend on welfare, Utrecht (%) |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                | Target area   | Non-target area | Target area   | Non-target area |
| Unemployment rate | 8,8           | 5,8             | 11,2          | 5,8             |
| 1999 Parse | 8,8 | 5,8 | 11,2 | 5,8 | 2000 Parse | 8,2 | 4,7 | 10,8 | 5,3 | 2001 Parse | 7,5 | 3,6 | 10,2 | 4,1 | 2003 Parse | 8,8 | 4,2 | 9,4 | 4,1 | 2005 Parse | 10 | 4,8 | 10,9 | 4,5 |
| Source: Gemeente Utrecht, 2006 |

| Table 3 Non-Western immigrants, Utrecht (%) |
|----------------|----------------|
| Target area   | Non-target area |
| Source: Gemeente Utrecht, 2006 |

4. The perception of policy makers

We interviewed about 20 people working at different institutions on the existence and character of spatial knock-on effects of the urban restructuring policy and on households who are forced to move in particular. The interviewed people work for
different organisations like for example a housing association. Housing associations are responsible for the state of the social housing stock, which is abundant in distressed urban areas in Utrecht. Policy makers of the municipality of Utrecht have been interviewed because they eventually have to give permission for the demolition plans. Also, policy makers who work at a police office or welfare organisations have been interviewed. The interviewees were asked about several topics like their awareness of spatial knock-on effects, the dispersal patterns of spatial knock-on effects and the way spatial knock-on effects have been incorporated in their urban renewal policies. All interviewees base their statements on their own opinion.

In Utrecht social renters are able to choose their own dwelling based on criteria that fit their personal characteristics like income and household size. Housing associations take care of allocating the right dwelling to the household with the longest waiting period. Forced movers however receive a so-called ‘urgentie-verklaring’ (urgency opportunity) which gives them a priority above regular renters looking for a dwelling. So, if a forced mover and a regular renter both apply for the same dwelling, the first one receives the keys of the front door. Forced movers also receive a certain amount of money to refurbish their new dwelling.

1. What dispersal patterns can be observed according to the interviewees?

The interviewed stakeholders all agree that the majority of the residents prefer to live close to the old dwelling. This can be a bordering neighbourhood, the same neighbourhood or even the same apartment building: “Sometimes even around 70 per cent of the households indicate they would like to live in the same neighbourhood, although utmost 30-40 per cent actually does so” (policy maker of housing association). This figure corresponds with the actual numbers found in a research of the municipality of Utrecht among 170 forced movers (table 4). The proportion of forced movers that stay within their own neighbourhood ranges from 24.8 to 43.8 per cent.

It appears that forced movers prefer to move within the same neighbourhood although the majority finds a new dwelling in a different neighbourhood. That means that not all forced movers have been able to realise their preferences. Out of the literature it appears that households also have to take their limitations into account. In the neo-Weberian approach this is referred to as the resources households possess. These resources can also be influenced by several institutions and their policy according to the institutional approach. For example, urban restructuring policy may result in a situation with less affordable dwellings in the city as a whole which will influence the choice opportunities for forced movers and regular renters. This is illustrated in the example of Hoograven (Utrecht) where many forced movers had the preference to move to another dwelling in Hoograven. Because, no new social rented dwellings were built in this area (although that was initially the plan) many had to move out of Hoograven. Some interviewees think that a lot of residents moved from Hoograven (number 20 in figure 1) to a nearby neighbourhood called Kanaleneiland (number 23 in figure 1). Explanations that are mentioned for this trend are the short distance to the new neighbourhood and the fact that most dwellings in Kanaleneiland also belong to the social rented sector. However, this trend does not show up in the quantitative data (table 4), since only 6.3 per cent actually moves from the involved districts South to Southwest.

Other dispersal patterns also seem to occur according to the interviewees. The first is that younger households seem to prefer a dwelling in or close to the city centre. They now have the opportunity to move to a dwelling in a central location, whereas otherwise they would probably have had to wait for a longer time period. Residents who are older choose to live closer to their children: “they follow their children who live in small cities close to Utrecht or in the extension area of Leidsche Rijn” (policy maker of housing association).
Table 4 Location of old and new dwelling of forced movers in Utrecht in 2006 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New dwelling</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Northwest</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>26,3</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>12,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>24,8</td>
<td>6,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overvecht</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>29,7</td>
<td>6,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City centre</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>6,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leidsche Rijn</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vleuten-de Meern</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not living in Utrecht anymore</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>12,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: questionnaire of the municipality of Utrecht (2006)

2. Do the interviewees recognise the existence of spatial knock-on effects?
   The interviewees are all familiar with the term spatial knock-on effects. When they are asked about possible displacement effects in their working environment they do easily come up with examples. In general policy makers do not think their policy leads to a displacement of problems. The general opinion is that the urban restructuring policy causes a more even spread of different types of households over the city, which is one of the goals of the policy. Therefore, the existence of a spatial knock-on effect does not seem to take place: “I don’t see new concentrations of forced movers come into existence. Forced movers do not all move to the same neighbourhoods but show very diverse dispersion patterns. I even doubt if the pattern would have been different if they were not forced to move. The forced relocation process only speeds up the general moving process” (policy maker of housing association). According to the interviewees, forced movers seem to have ample opportunities to move to and they are able to receive the dwelling they prefer. Spatial knock-on effects do not take place because new concentrations of social rented households do not come into existence.

   The interviewees however do mention two examples of spatial knock-on effects. The first one only takes place on a very small scale if a household moves from an already demolished dwelling to a dwelling that will be demolished in the future. Generally, this is not considered a real problem and it can even be a strategic move: “For households who want to return to the old neighbourhood it means they have relatively cheap housing facilities until the new dwellings are finished in the old neighbourhood” (policy maker of housing association). The second example concerns the idea that some forced movers cause troubles in their new neighbourhood: “When Leidsche Rijn was built they started with the relatively inexpensive dwellings both social rented or owner occupied which attracted a lot of residents from Hoograven and Kanaleneiland, both neighbourhoods within the target areas. These residents took the chance to move to a newly built dwelling and I got the feeling they also brought their criminal activities with them. This not only increases criminality rates in Leidsche Rijn but its effects are also felt in bordering municipalities like the one where I live. Here, we are not able anymore to leave our radio in the car because of the increase in car thefts” (policy maker of housing association).

3. How do the interviewees explain spatial knock-on effects?
   For policy makers it is difficult to explain the reason why spatial knock-on effects come into existence. They mention different reasons about the dispersal pattern and the reasons that households prefer to move within their own neighbourhood: “People seem to be attached to their neighbourhood or don’t like the idea of having to leave
their neighbourhood or are afraid to lose their social contacts” (policy makers of housing associations). The dispersal pattern however is influenced by the supply of social rented dwellings. Policy makers from housing associations all observe that the majority of forced movers end up in another social rented dwelling. Buying a dwelling is not very common: only 2-5 per cent of the residents moves into the owner occupied sector (policy makers of housing associations). The low incomes of the residents involved are the main reason for this. Therefore, forced movers largely depend on the housing stock of housing corporations: “In Utrecht we find the social rented housing stock to be concentrated in some neighbourhoods” (policy maker of housing association). The final dwelling the household therefore depends on the dispersion of vacancies according to the interviewees: “ Forced movers do have a priority above other households when choosing a dwelling but their possibilities still depend on the supply of vacant dwellings” (policy maker of housing association).

It appears that the actual dispersal patterns are influenced by different factors like the preferences of the involved households, income restrictions and the location and the supply of social rented dwellings. This relates to the earlier discussed institutional approach where individual preferences are restricted by rules from institutions. For example housing corporations seem to have a large say in the location of the new dwelling of forced movers.

4. Do the interviewees try to avoid spatial knock-on effects?
In general, policy makers do not think the urban restructuring projects lead to new concentrations of lower income households because the moving patterns show a spread of people over the city. An exception is the new concentration of low income households in Leidsche Rijn, which could have been prevented according to one interviewee: “Local government has to listen carefully to their residents if they notice a displacement of problems. Unfortunately, local government did not immediately listen to the complaints of residents in Leidsche Rijn and did not react until problems already got out of hand. The policy was to create a mixed housing stock, but they started to build the social rented dwellings and cheaper owner occupied dwellings first. It would have been better if more expensive dwellings would have been built simultaneously to prevent concentrations of lower income households” (policy maker of housing association).

Several interviewees are also aware of possible spatial knock-on effects concerning so-called problem households and try to prevent them from carrying their problems with them. Therefore a case manager is assigned on the project whose task is to help individual households to find a new dwelling if they have trouble finding one on their own or when personal household problems are detected: “Households with problems like financial debts, problems with police or psychological problems are directed to the right organisations. You don't know the effects but we try not to displace problem households to other areas” (policy maker of housing department of municipality).

Policy makers have also been asked about their opinion on the term ‘thinning’. This means that problems do not longer concentrate in problem areas, but are now more evenly spread over for example the neighbourhood or the entire city. Causing a spatial knock-on effect then would be an explicit goal of the policy. Overall, the interviewees in Utrecht do not think that thinning can be used as a way to solve problems because it provides only a solution on the short term. Yet, some policy makers think that thinning can be a real policy solution: “If problems disperse over a larger area, this means that they are less concentrated. In a neighbourhood with multiple problems, thinning out might be a good idea because this makes the neighbourhood better manageable” (policy maker of housing association). An argument for this policy might be that policy makers think it is fair is everyone who wants to live in a big city has to deal with big city problems to some extent.
5. What do the interviewees think about spatial knock-on effects in the future?

According to the interviewees, one of the problems of the policy of urban restructuring concerns the waiting period for a social rented dwelling. Forced movers receive an urgency opportunity that provides them with a priority above regular social renters. For regular renters this means that their waiting period increases, because more renters apply for the same dwelling while the supply of social rented dwellings remains the same. As Table 5 shows, the waiting period for regular social renters in 1995-2003 has indeed increased with more than 2 years. The interviewees expect that the waiting period will only increase in the future. This has an effect on the whole social rental market in Utrecht.

Table 5 Waiting period for regular social renters, Utrecht (years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Waiting Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gemeente Utrecht (2004b)

Another thing that is mentioned by the interviewees is that future demolition projects might cause more problems. The reason for this relates to the specific neighbourhoods where the policy is carried out. Kanaleneiland and Overvecht are two neighbourhoods where a lot of large-scale restructuring projects will start in the near future: “These neighbourhoods house a lot of people that are poor, do not have a job and have other problems. We do not know where these households will move to but we expect that the demolition projects will lead to an increase of problems in other neighbourhoods” (policy maker of housing association). Although policy makers do foresee some problems in the future, in practice the policy attentions remains focused on the target areas where neighbourhoods are redeveloped and less attention is being paid to other areas. We think this shows that spatial knock-on effects should be higher on the agenda.

5. Discussion and conclusion

In this paper we took a closer look at so-called spatial knock-on effects of urban policies. Policy actions in a city are now directed to the areas most in need. However, this area-based approach can lead to a displacement of problems to other locations than the target areas of the policy. We need to learn more about the effects of area-based urban policies in order to make good evaluations. Therefore, spatial knock-on effects should be more central when studying urban issues. The data in this paper are based on the Dutch city of Utrecht and focuses on three different questions: In which way can spatial knock-on effects be observed as a result of area-based urban restructuring policies according to policy makers? What is the geographical dispersal pattern of those who are forced to move as a consequence of urban restructuring and how do policy makers explain these dispersal patterns? In which way do policy makers try to prevent spatial knock-on effects? The focus has been on the opinion of policy makers.

In Utrecht the Big Cities Policy is implemented to solve urban problems. Its measures are directed towards a selected number of problem areas in the city. One of the goals of the policy is to create a ‘better’ dispersal of different groups of people in the city. When looking at data related with concentrations of people before and after the implementation of Big Cities Policy, it appears that the percentage of unemployed people, people that depend on welfare and non-Western immigrants show a more negative trend in target areas compared to the rest of the city. This
leads to the implication that policies aiming at a more even spread of people, were not very successful.

In general, policy makers in Utrecht are of the opinion that forced movers spread out over various locations and do not cause concentrations in other parts of the city. A spatial knock-on effect thus does not seem to be a great issue. Area-based urban policies not really affect other neighbourhoods although an exception can be made for Leidsche Rijn. After building this new neighbourhood households from target areas Hoograven and Kanaleneiland were attracted by the relatively cheap dwellings, thereby causing a new concentration of lower income households.

At the same time the interviewed policy makers are of the opinion that households prefer to move within or close to the old neighbourhood because they are attached to this neighbourhood. This idea is also confirmed by data of a questionnaire that is carried out by the municipality of Utrecht. Related to the literature it appears that the behaviour of households influences the outcomes of policy measures. Although their preferences might be to move within or close to the old neighbourhood they might face financial constraints because they are not able to buy a dwelling and therefore depend on the social rented housing stock. They might also face constraints from the housing associations because their housing stock is concentrated in several neighbourhoods. The majority of the households that are forced to move are not able to fulfil their preferences. This however, does not have to be negative, despite the remark that those households are limited in their choices. It is also possible that forced movers are complete satisfied with the situation in their new dwelling. A reason for this might be that they were not completely aware of their possibilities and that they were biased towards their previous dwelling. In the end the new dwelling and new neighbourhood does not have to be as bad as expected.

Another issue relates to the time social renters have to wait before they can apply for a dwelling. Since forced movers have a priority above regular renters the pressure on the housing market increases. For normal renters this means they have to wait longer before they are can apply for a dwelling. This means that area-based policies can lead to an indirect side effect. Households who are forced to move do not form new concentrations of people in other locations but they influence the waiting period for regular renters of the social housing stock. Their influence on the owner-occupied sector is marginal since the majority of the forced movers are not able to buy a dwelling.

At least three reasons can be given for the small attention for spatial knock-on effects of urban policies. First, it is possible that politicians and policymakers are not interested in measuring the effects. The existence and identification of spatial knock-on effects can be detrimental for success stories that may be told when the analysis of policy effects is limited to the targeted area only. When urban policies are area-based, policy makers are generally only criticised for results in their target areas and not in the rest of the city. This is also agreed on by the interviewed policy makers who mention they might foresee problems in the future but somehow find it difficult to apply this into their actual policy. Secondly, spatial knock-on effects are difficult to measure. Sometimes it is even difficult to measure the direct effect of a policy. For example, is a declining rate of unemployment an effect of a policy measure or of a booming economy? So, evaluating the indirect effects of urban policies is even more difficult. Thirdly, policy makers, while putting area-based urban policies into practice, may not always aim at preventing spatial side-effects. Instead, their aim can be to purposively spread the problem over a larger area (thinning). In our opinion this erodes the legitimisation of the policy and we do think that good evaluations of the effect of area-based urban policies are necessary. If a problem becomes less severe by spreading it over a larger area, the effect may be that more people have to deal with it than before. Besides, thinning out problems over a larger area does not have
to be solution to the problem according to the residents. They may still feel unsafe, despite the spreading of the problem.

We strongly believe more research into spatial knock-on effects is needed if we want to have good evaluations of urban policies. Here, we like to mention two research topics that need more attention. The first is that spatial knock-on effects not only apply to households who are forced to move. Another important theme where area-based urban policy may cause spatial knock-on effects applies to criminality and safety issues. An example is when crime reduction schemes are set up by more surveillance of police officers which causes a reduction in crime rates in target area. However, a possible side effect of the policy is that criminals relocate their activities to other areas. A second topic relates to the idea that most research attention is being paid to policy effects in target areas, whereas less focus is on the non-target areas. But especially these areas might experience the effects of the policy carried out in another area because of an inflow of problems.
References


List of interviewed people in Utrecht

- Two policy makers of municipality of department of housing working
- Policy maker of housing association Mitros working with the housing stock
- Employee of consultant agency Het vierde huis (The fourth dwelling) for municipalities and housing associations
- Process manager of safety for South Utrecht
• Account manager of municipality of department of city development
• Researcher of municipality of department of city development
• Policy maker of welfare organisation for Southeast Utrecht working with youngsters
• Process manager of safety for Northwest Utrecht
• Process manager of municipality of department of public safety and security
• Assistant manager for central Utrecht of department of city development
• Manager for central Utrecht of department of city development
• Senior consultant of housing association Portaal
• Manager of municipality of Utrecht of department of social affairs working with integration issues
• Process manager of safety for Southwest Utrecht
• Employee of police for Central Utrecht
• Process manager of safety in Overvecht
• Policy maker of project Jeugd op straat (Youngsters on the streets)
• Process manager of municipality of department of health issues

Other sources

Questionnaire of the municipality of Utrecht (2006)